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Guilt By Association
and The AEDPA's Fund Raising Ban
1. INTRODUCTION
Although terrorists cannot tear down a free society by
themselves, they might be able to strike enough fear into a free
society to convince it to destroy itself.' Since the end of the cold war,
terrorism has emerged as this society's most feared hidden enemy,
surpassing even the threat of nuclear weapons.2 In an effort to deter
and punish terrorism, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA" or "the Act"). The
problem with that legislation is that it does not live up to its name
because it does very little to stop terrorism. 4 Instead, the Act has
revived the unconstitutional concept of guilt by association and as
such, illustrated the maxim that during unsettled times, government
officials tend to sacrifice the rights of individual citizens in the name
of national security.5
The AEDPA's fundraising ban permits a United States citizen
to be imprisoned, up to ten years, for supporting - through
contributions - the non-violent conduct of a group that our
government believes threatens its national security.6 The fundraising
ban does not require "specific intent" to further the illegal goals of an
organization through an individual's contributions in order to impose
I See David B. Kopel, Cato Handbook for Congress: Terrorism (visited
Mar. 6, 1999) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb. 105-2 1 >.
2 See Victoria Meyerov, Note, The Buck Stops Here: Illinois Criminalizes
Support for International Terrorism, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 871, 877 (1997).
3See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214-1319 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 28, 18, 42, 8, 22, & 40
U.S.C.).
4See infra notes 64-153 and accompanying text.
5 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that "history teaches [us] that grave threats
to liberty . . . [have] come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too
extravagant to endure.").
6See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
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criminal sanctions. 7  As such, it is particularly dangerous. As an
unconstitutional result of that ban, the innocent fundraising activities
of individuals and many human rights activists who wish to provide
support to humanitarian struggles abroad, are now become criminal.
8
The bitter irony surrounding the passage of the AEDPA is
that it was enacted during a time when our country was essentially
free from political overthrow and/or foreign invasion.9 Now that the
Act has been passed, the Constitution not American society is under
attack; and in the name of some speculative interest in public safety,
we have once again sacrificed our protected liberties of free speech
and association.10 Surely, Congress has overstepped its constitutional
bounds by making it a federal crime to give political contributions to
an organization's "legal and peaceful activities," even if the
organization has been designated as "terrorist."" Practicing the
"politics of the last atrocity," Congress enacted the AEDPA in its
rush to calm the nation's fears, and in doing so, needlessly trammeled
on U.S. citizens' First Amendment liberties and freedoms in
exchange for an inadequate antiterrorism solution.'
2
This note is comprised of several sections that attempt to shed
an analytical light on the AEDPA's fundraising ban. The second
section explores the evolution of the concept of "guilt by
association," the history of terrorism in the United States, and our
7 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (requiring only "knowledge" of providing
support as a prerequisite for the imposition of criminal sanctions).
8 See Robyn E. Blumner, Punished For Your Support, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, at I D.
9 See Garth Molander, Machiavellian Jurisprudence: The United States
Supreme Court's Doctrinal Approach to Political Speech Under the First Amendment,
10 TOURO L. REV. 593, 631-32 (explaining that "our leaders and the public both believ[e]
our nation to be relatively free of the danger of foreign infiltration, overthrow of
democracy, or other substantial evil .... )
10 See infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
I See Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.
J. 693, 699 (1998) (citing to Terrorism in the United States: The Nature and Extent of the
Threat and Possible Legislative Response: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
104th Cong. 161 (1995) (testimony of James X. Dempsey, Deputy Director, Center for
National Security Studies).
12 See id. at 693.
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government's responses to the terrorist phenomenon.' 3  The
controversial provisions of the AEDPA's fundraising ban are laid out
in the third section 14 while the fourth section analyzes the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in regard to the conflict between the First
Amendment and fundraising bans. 15 Because the Supreme Court has
not yet addressed the Act's fundraising ban, the fifth section
scrutinizes the California District Court's justification for approving
the provision. 16  Next, the sixth section introduces the state of
Illinois' anti-terrorism statute. 17 That law is a model Congress should
use if and when it amends the AEDPA because it contains all of the
necessary First Amendment protections that should have been
incorporated into the original Act. Finally, the seventh section
concludes with a brief recap of the above discussion and analysis and
calls to Congress to amend the unconstitutional fundraising
provisions contained in the AEDPA.
18
II. GUILT BY ASSOCIATION: THE GOVERNMENT'S SOLUTION TO
TERRORISM
Terrorism, in one form or another, has been present
throughout this country's history, but there is no universal definition
of what it actually is. 19 Initially, terrorist activity in American society
took the form of anti-government sentiment.20 Blatantly disregarding
First Amendment freedoms, our government responded to that
"perceived" anti-government threat by deporting people. For
13 See infra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
Is See infra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 64-153 and accompanying text.
17See infra notes 154-175 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 176-185 and accompanying text.
19 See generally Beverly Allen, Talking "Terrorism": Ideologies and
Paradigms in a Postmodern World, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 7, 8 (1996)
(explaining that the definition of terrorism depends upon the user's "point of view").
20 See generally Susan Aschoff, The Politics of Immigration, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 21, 1997, at IF.
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example, in the 18th century this technique was used against the
French when their political views were not compatible with the then
current United States government.21 Then, in the early 2 0 th century,
"the Supreme Court upheld many prosecutions of controversial
speakers under the Espionage Act of 1917.' '22 Following closely
behind that legislation was the Sedition Act of 1918,23 which made it
a crime to utter language, intended to bring the United States
government into "contempt, scorn, or disrepute."
24
Later in the 2 0 th century, Congress enacted yet more
legislation aimed at curtailing freedom of speech and association.
For example, the regulation of mere "advocacy, organizing, and
'knowing' membership" in controversial groups was made possible
through the Alien Registration Act (the "Smith Act") of the 1940s.25
During the 1950s, Congress enacted the McCarran-Walter Act
26
which "required the registration of all Communist Party members,
prohibited any Party member from working in a defense facility or
holding office with a labor organization, or, among other things,
obtaining a passport, and sometimes required the deportation of past
or present Party members., 27 In the next decade, the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 punishes domestic terrorism.
28
Over the last few years, this country has suffered from intense
terrorist hysteria stemming from several high profile occurrences.
21 See id.
22 See Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109
HARV. L. REV. 2075, 2090 (1996) (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (holding that inflammatory statements during a time of war supported a
conviction for conspiracy)).
23 Ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
24 See id.
25 See Mark Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of
Freedom ofAdvocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 1 1-12 (1991).
2650 U.S.C. 781-858 (1982).
27 See Beall, supra note 11, at 698 & n.53.
28 Pub. L. No., 90-284, 82 Stat. 73-92 (1968) (codified in scattered scetions
of 18, 25 & 42 U.S.C.). See also Meyerov, supra note 2, at 878.
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These are the World Trade Center bombing,29 the bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 30 the bombing
of the U.S. Army barracks in Saudi Arabia,3' the highly suspected
terrorist bombing of the TWA Flight 800,32 and the bombing in
Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park.33 After the Oklahoma City and
the World Trade Center bombings, the American peoples' fear of
terrorism intensified because the nation, for the first time, was
exposed to the reality of terrorism on home soil.34 The "Oklahoma
City blast resulted [in frenzied politicians] . . . clamor[ing] for the
passage of strict anti-terrorist legislation., 35 That political frenzy, in
turn, gave rise to the AEDPA of 1996.36
III. THE AEDPA's FUNDRAISING BAN
In conjunction with the one-year anniversary of the
Oklahoma City bombing, 37 Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and
29 See generally Robert D. McFadden, "Explosion at the Twin Towers, The
Overview; Blast Hits Trade Center, Bomb Suspected; 5 Killed, Thousands Flee Smoke in
Towers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at Al.
30 See generally David Stout, Terror in Oklahoma City: Memories of.
WACO; Remnants ofBranch Davidians Gather to Grieve and Look to the Future, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995 at B12.
31 See generally Douglas Jehl, Bombing in Saudi Arabia; The Overview;
Saudis, Aided by the F.B.I., Seek Blast Clues, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1996, at Al.
32 See generally Matthew Purdy, The Crash of Flight 800; The
Investigation; Searchfor Clues ofFlight 800 Focuses on Ocean Floor, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 1996, at Al.
33 See generally Kevin Sack, Bomb at the Olympics: The Overview;
Olympics Park Blast Kills One, Hurts 111; Atlanta Games Go On, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1996, at Al.
34 See Ella Dlin, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996:
An Attempt to Quench Anti-Immigration Sentiments, 38 CATH. LAW. 49, 52-55 (stating
that "[tIhe bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City affected the entire nation
due to its sheer magnitude").
35 See id. at 55.
36 See Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996).
37 See Blown Away?, supra note 22, at 2075.
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to deter third party financial
support to terrorist groups.38 President Clinton stated that the Act is a
"tribute to the victims of terrorism and to the men and women in law
enforcement who dedicate their lives to protecting all of us from the
scourge of terrorist activity." 39. The President failed to mention that
the legislation unconstitutionally restricts the freedom of speech and
association of all Americans.
Even though the AEDPA has been on the books since 1996,
the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of its fundraising ban. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California, however, addressed the
Act's fundraising ban in the context of a motion for preliminary
injunction in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno40 on June 8, 1998.
Although the court refused to enjoin the enforcement of most of the
preliminary injunction on June 15, 1998, that prevented the
government from taking action against the plaintiff's contributions of
"personnel" or "training" to their respective organizations.4' The
Central District Court, with Judge Collins presiding, correctly and
concisely summarized the Act's fundraising ban and its terrorist
designation procedure as follows:
1. Section 302 of the AEDPA permits the Secretary of
State (the 'Secretary'), in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General,
to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist
organization ... if the Secretary finds that[:] (A) the
organization is a foreign organization; (B) the
organization engages in terrorist activity ... ; and (C)
38 See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1247, § 301(b) (1996). "The purpose
of the [Act] is to ...prevent persons within the United States .. . from providing
material support or resources to foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities."
Id.
39 See President's Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WKLY. COMP. PREs. Doc. 719, 721 (Apr. 29, 1996). See
also Beall, supra note I1, at 693 & n.3.
40 9 F.Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Humanitarian Law
Project I].
41 9 F.Supp. 2d 1205 (C.D. Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Humanitarian Law
Project I].
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the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the
security of United States nationals or the national
security of the United States.' The AEDPA defines
'terrorist activity' as 'an act which the actor knows, or
reasonably should know, affords material support to
any individual, organization, or government in
conducting a terrorist activity at any time.' 'National
security' is defined as 'the national defense, foreign
relations, or economic interests of the United States.'
2. Prior to designating an organization as a foreign
terrorist organization, the Secretary must notify
specified members of Congress. Seven days
thereafter, the Secretary must publish the designation
in the Federal Register. The designation is effective
upon publication.
3. A group designated as a foreign terrorist
organization may seek judicial review of the
Secretary's designation by filing an action in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia within 30 days of the published
designation. Any review 'shall be based solely upon
the administrative record, except that the Government
may submit, for ex parte and in camera review,
classified information used in making the
designation.' Section 1189 sets. forth certain
circumstances wherein the Court of Appeals may set
aside the Secretary's designation. Inaddition to the
Court of Appeals setting aside a designation, a group
may cease to be designated as a foreign terrorist
organization only if: (1) the Secretary fails to renew
the designation after two years; (2). Congress blocks
or revokes a designation; or (3) the Secretary revokes
the designation based on. . at changed circumstances
or national security warrants such a revocation.
4. Section 303 of the AEDPA provides: 'Whoever,
within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, knowingly provides material
1999] 481
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support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.' The AEDPA defines the term
'material support or resources' as 'currency or other
financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel,,
transportation, and other physical assets, except
medicine or religious materials.'
4 2
Although Judge Collins correctly summarized the Act's provisions,
she incorrectly applied the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence when she evaluated the constitutionality of the
fundraising ban.43  In order to address the court's gross
misapplication of constitutional law, the next section lays out the
Supreme Court's current views on fundraising bans 4 4 and the fifth
section, in turn, discusses the California District Court's disregard of
the Supreme Court's philosophy of law by way of its approval of the
AEDPA's fundraising ban.45
IV. Fundraising Bans and the First Amendment
Although the' freedom of speech and the freedom of
association are closely related concepts, the Supreme Court differs in
the way it has treated the respective freedoms in the context of the
First Amendment. For example, in Texas v. Johnson,46 the Court
held that conduct, as political expression, is protected activity.
47
Freedom of speech, however, has never been held to be fully
42 See id. at 1206-07.
43 See infra notes 63-153 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 64-153 and accompanying text.
46 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
47 See id. at 420.
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protected, since certain categories of speech have received little or no
constitutional guardianship. 48  Specifically, under the Brandenburg
v. Ohio test, speech that advocates illegal action, may be suppressed if
"such advocacy is directed toward inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. 49
Unlike freedom of speech, the First Amendment freedom of
association is even harder to quantify because it arises by implication
and is not expressly enumerated in the Constitution.50 "In Eqfbrandt
v. Russell,51 the Supreme Court held that Congress may not ban
membership in groups that pursue both legal and illegal ends."
52
While Elorant protects the right to associate with a group to pursue
lawful purposes, 53 in certain situations, membership in a group may
justify criminal charges. 54  Similar to an individual's freedom of
speech, associational freedom is not violated if the government can
prove that the individual charged was intentionally furthering the
illegal goals of a group in which he was an active member.5 In that
scenario, however, the government carries the burden of proving that
a group's objective rose to the level of instigating an illegal action,
48 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (holding that the
First Amendment does not protect obscenity). See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-64 (1980) (stating that commercial
speech is not entitled to full First Amendment protection).
49 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
50 The word "association" does not appear in the text of the First
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition." Id. Further, as the Supreme Court noted in NAACP v. Alabama, "Effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized
by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
51. 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1996) (rejecting an Arizona statute that provided for
"guilt by association" which punished mere membership in an organization).
52See Blown Away?, supra note 22, at 2087.
53See Elfbrandt, 384 U.S. at 17-18.
54 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 206 (1961) (upholding a
conviction for membership in the communist party under the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2385).
See id. at 220-21.
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not just advocating a position. 56  Uncertainty always surrounds
associational analysis since it is unclear how the Court actually draws
the line between instigation and advocacy; but clearly instigation is
the element that is supposed to be punished rather than any injurious
actions that may occur later.57
Upon closer inspection of the history underlying the
AEDPA's fundraising ban,. the Supreme Court has expressly held
fundraising activities to be protected by the First -Amendment.
Specifically, the notion that the giving of money qualifies as a form
of "speech" worthy of protection was espoused by the Supreme Court
in Buckley v. Valeo.5 8 In that case, the Court applied strict scrutiny to
certain provisions limiting campaign spending contained in the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.. 9 Explaining that some of
the restrictions implicated First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association by limiting an individual's ability to use money to express
their political preferences, 60 the court struck down a provision
involving a limit on a candidate's personal, independent, and overall
campaign expeiiditures.6'
56 See generally Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 301 (1961) (Black, J.,
concurring).
57 See id. at 298-99
58424.U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining that "[a] restriction on the
amount of money a person can spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploratoin, and the size of the audience reached.").
59Id. Although the Court never used the phrase "strict scrutiny," they did
apply a "strict scrutiny" analysis. For example, the Court stated:
In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate,
governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing
the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.' Yet,
it is clear that '[n]either the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute.' Even a 'significant
interference' with protected rights of political association' may
be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important
interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms."
Id. (internal citations ommited).' See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 592-610 (1994).
60 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23.
61 See id. at 58.
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In accordance with the Buckley rationale, the Supreme Court,
in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,62 held that the contribution
of money is protected speech since the "money is spent to project"
ideas and the presence of that money does not dilute the speech's
constitutional protection.63  In light of the Buckley and Discovery
Network decisions, the AEDPA's ban on donations to designated
terrorist groups most certainly implicates protected First Amendment
rights of free speech and association consistent with the Supreme
Court's money-as-speech jurisprudence.
V. THE AEDPA AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Congress enacted the AEDPA to prevent terrorism by
federally criminalizing third party financial contributions to
organizations 64 that our government has previously designated as
"terrorist." 65 Despite Congress' good intentions, the Act is clearly
ineffective because it contains provisions that punish activities that
have little or no connection to the prevention of terrorism.66 Given
the Act's ineffectiveness in achieving its purpose, it is relatively safe
to say that Congress responded to American society's public outrage
resulting from recent terrorist attacks such as the Oklahoma tragedy,
and passed the statute in an attempt to allay the fears of the American
people.67 In other words, Congress did not have the requisite
justification to hail the AEDPA as necessary to prevent terrorism, and
the Act's infringement on free speech and association can only be
62 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
63 See id. at 420 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
64 See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1247, § 301(b) (1996). "The purpose
of the [Act] is to . . .prevent.persons within the United States . . . from providing
material support or resources to foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities."
Id.
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1).
66 See Dlin, supra note 34, at 51-52, 61.
67 See id. at 55.
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viewed as unconstitutional.68 Unfortunately, the California District
Court did not agree with this conclusion.69
A. The Basis for the Decision
As previously stated in section III, District Judge Collins of
the United States District Court of the Central District of California
reviewed the constitutionality of the Act's controversial provision in
response to the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction against
the government's enforcement of the fundraising ban.70  The
plaintiffs to the litigation were composed of six groups and two
United States citizens who wanted to contribute to the political and
the humanitarian activities of the Partiya Karkeran Kuedistan (PKK)
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) respectively.7'
The Center for Constitutional Rights72 brought the suit and named
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Attorney General Janet Reno,
and the State Department as defendants.
73
As a direct consequence of the Secretary of State's
designation of both the PKK and the LTTE as foreign terrorist groups
on October 8, 1997,74 the plaintiffs were prevented from providing
any support to the PKK and the LTTE out of fear of criminal
sanctions.75 The plaintiff's argued that the AEDPA's fundraising ban
is unconstitutional because it makes the lawful exercise of their First
68 See infra notes 84-153 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 70-153 and accompanying text.
70 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
See id. at 1180.
72 See Linda Deutsch, Lawsuit Challenges U.S. Ban On Assisting Foreign
'Terrorist' Groups, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6646558
(stating that "[a]ttomey Nancy Chang of the Center for Constitutional Rights, which filed
the suit, said it challenges the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
which makes it a crime to provide material support or resources to activities of foreign
organizations designated as 'terrorist' by the Secretary of State").
73See Martha A. Bellisle, Judge OK's Support to 'Terrorists', ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6681425.
74See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d. at 1180 (citing Fed. Reg.
52,649-51).
71 See id. at 1182.
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Amendment rights of free speech and association a criminal
offense. 76 The crux of their argument centered on the fact that the
AEDPA does not require "specific intent" to further the illegal aims
of the PKK and LTTE before a criminal violation arises. As such,
the Act imposes guilt by association and infringes on their protected
free speech.
As a preliminary mater, the plaintiffs only victory came by
way of the court's ruling that the U.S. government was not permitted
to prevent them (the humanitarian activists) from providing "training"
or "personnel" in the United States78 for the PKK's and the LTTE's
lawful pursuits, even though the groups were previously "designated
as terrorist organizations." 79  Relying on the doctrine of
impermissible vagueness, the court held the AEDPA's provisions for
the procurement of "personnel" and "training" unconstitutional.80
Unfortunately, the court declined to strike down the AEDPA's
fundraising ban by not permitting the plaintiffs to legally "supply
materials8 1 - ranging from blankets and food for refugees to cash
contributions - [to the peaceful activities] of the [two]
organizations."8 2  Instead, the court upheld the fundraising ban
because Judge Collins believed the plaintiffs could not show that the
AEDPA's "material support" provision violated their rights to
76 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
See id.
78 See Reuters, Anti-terrorism Law Dealt Death Blow, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., June 16, 1998, atA6.
79See Bellisle, supra note 73.
80 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05. See also
Bellisle, supra note 73 (stating that "Chris Watney, a Justice Department spokeswoman,
said officials had not reviewed the ruling, and she did not know whether it would be
appealed").
81 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. at 1196-97 (stating that
"[pilaintiffs have failed to establish a probability of success on their claim that the
AEDPA's prohibition on all material support to designated terrorist organizations,
regardless of the individual's lack of intent to further illegal activities, violates their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association and, thus, are not entitled to a
preliminary injunction on this claim").
82 See Reuters supra note 78, at A6.
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freedom of speech and association despite the fact that the law does
not require an individual's specific intent to further a group's illegal
activities in order to prove a criminal violation.
83
In order to justify its decision upholding the AEDPA's
fundraising ban, the California District Court began by explaining the
ban is within the constitutional power of the federal government to
enact. Specifically, the power to pass the Act derives from the
principle that "[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized the broad
authority afforded the national government in the foreign policy
realm., 84 Rather than challenge the governmental power issue, the
plaintiffs conceded that the government did have such power in
matters relating to the conduct of foreign relations. They focused,
instead, on the issue of whether the AEDPA's "prohibition of
contributions to further political and humanitarian ends 'is no greater
than essential' to further the government's interest in national
security and foreign policy.
85
Next, Judge Collins stated that the right of Americans to
associate with nonresident aliens was not absolute and explained that
the government "may interfere with an individual's right to political
association if it demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and
employs means closely drawn to avoid the unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms. 86  The court went on to hold that the
plaintiffs' First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of
association were not likely violated by the AEDPA's fundraising ban
which criminally prohibits individuals and organizations from
providing material support to organizations that had been previously
designated as terrorist. 87 Utilizing intermediate scrutiny, the court
found that the "government had a substantial interest in furthering
national security, and [the] government's prohibition of contributions
83 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1196-97.
84 Id. at 1212 (quoting Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 940
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984)).
85 See Humanitarian Law Project!, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
86 See id. at 1185 (granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction).
87 See id. at 1176.
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to organizations was not related to suppression of free expression.
" 88
B. The Illogical Foundations
Now that the basis of the court's decision concerning the
AEDPA's fundraising ban has been laid out, the rest of this section
probes the logical foundation of that decision. The first issue to
examine is whether in applying intermediate scrutiny, the District
Court chose the appropriate level of review. Judge Collins deemed
intermediate scrutiny appropriate because "[tihe AEDPA's
prohibition on providing any financial contributions to the PKK and
LTTE is a content-neutral limitation on the plaintiffs' right to
freedom of association because it is unrelated to the suppression of
the communicative nature of the plaintiffs' associational activities."A
9
She also noted "Statutory classifications are generally valid if they
bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose[;but,]
[s]tatutes are subjected to a higher... scrutiny if they interfere with
the exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech. 9°
The conclusion that the AEDPA's fundraising ban is content
neutral, is of critical importance to the analysis of the ban's
constitutionality because it dictates the court's level of review.
Specifically, strict scrutiny is applied to content based restrictions on
free speech and association and intermediate scrutiny is applied to
content neutral restrictions. In support of its decision to apply
intermediate scrutiny, the court explained, "[a]s a general rule, [in
determining the level of scrutiny applied to a regulation that burdens
free speech,] laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are
content based,... [whereas] laws that ... impose burdens on speech
without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most
instances content neutral." 9' In other words, since the court viewed
88 See id.
89 See Humanitarian Law Project 11, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
90 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 (citing Bullfrog
Films Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 509 (9
t
h Cir. 1988)).
91 See id. at 1188 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 643 (1994)).
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the AEDPA's fundraising ban as a regulation that is unrelated to the
suppression of a particular message or idea, it is considered content
neutral and, as such, subject to only intermediate scrutiny.92
After deciding to evaluate the AEDPA's fundraising ban
through the lens of the intermediate scrutiny standard, the court
applied the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien.93 That test
included the appraisal of the following factors:
"(1) whether the regulation was within the power of
the government; (2) whether the regulation furthered
an important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
whether the proffered interest was unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (4) whether the
incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms
was no greater than essential to further the important
interest. 94
As stated above, when evaluating whether the court chose the correct
standard of review, the critical fact, at issue, is whether the court
correctly classified the AEDPA's fundraising ban as a content neutral
limitation on First Amendment rights. In regard to that choice, the
court's application of the O'Brien test was grossly misplaced because
Judge Collins was fundamentally incorrect in her characterization of
the plaintiffs' contributions and support as purely "conduct" and
"unrelated to communication" or expression.
Rather than applying the test from O'Brien, the district court
should have looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v.
Valeo95 for guidance because the campaign financing restrictions
reviewed in Buckley limited expressive rights just like the AEDPA's
anti-fundraising provisions limit political expression. 96 Specifically,
the Buckley court, held that the First Amendment is implicated
92 See id.
93391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
94See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
95424 U.S. 1.
96 See BealI, supra note 11, at 700.
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whenever the government attempts to regulate financial campaign
contributions97  and that "strict scrutiny" may apply when
associational rights are impinged by governmental action. 98 The
Court justified its decision that the campaign financing restrictions
were not content neutral and thus subject to strict scrutiny by noting
that "[v]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass
society requires the expenditure of money," 99 and the symbol of
support is part of the contribution itself. °00
Since the Supreme Court found the campaign restrictions in
Buckley to be related to expression, it certainly follows that the
California District Court should have found the ADEPA's fundraising
ban expressive in nature. Strict scrutiny, not intermediate scrutiny
should have been the standard of review employed by Judge Collins.
While it is true that the Buckley Court actually upheld some of the
restrictions on federal campaign contributions contained in the
FECA, those restrictions were much less oppressive and restrictive in
that they were not a complete ban on contributions like those
contained in the provisions of the AEDPA.' 0 ' It is highly likely that
if the California District Court correctly followed the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence and applied strict scrutiny to
the AEDPA's fundraising ban, that provision would not have
survived constitutional muster since it is, in fact, related to the
communicative nature of the financial contributions or support it
prohibits. Therefore, the AEDPA's fundraising ban, in its present
form unnecessarily and unconstitutionally infringes on U.S. citizens'
right of free speech and association.
The idea that the AEDPA's fundraising ban unnecessarily
infringes on the right of free speech and association is supported by
97See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
98 See id at 25.
99 See id. at 19. "[Ilt is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the
alleged 'conduct' of giving . . . money arises in some measure because the
communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." Id. at
17.
100 See id. at 21.
101 See Beall, supra note 11, at 700.
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the fact that it constrains the ability of Americans to give and be
exposed to ideas from abroad that oppose current U.S. policy.
0 2
Remember, that in the not so distant past, "McCarthy-inspired
immigration laws" prevented the literary great and Nobel prize
winner, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, as well as, Yves Montand, the
French film star, from entering this country because of their
Communist "leanings."'10 3  Self-censorship, not the prevention of
terrorism, may be the most likely direct effect of this antiterrorism
law, since people will be less inclined to join or support groups that
hold views or advocate positions different from the majority of
society out of a fear that the group will eventually be designated as
terrorist. 0 4 Along with the fear of designation, the fear of criminal
sanctions would certainly chill the free speech and conduct of
controversial (but non-terrorist) organizations.'
0 5
The next issue to evaluate is the magnitude of the
government's interest in preventing terrorism. Judge Collins viewed
terrorism as a national security issue and explained that "[t]he
government's interest in national security is a compelling one,
permitting the government to impose restrictions on a citizens' ability
to maintain associations with foreign entities °6 [and that] . . . any
regulation that infringes on an individual's right to associate with
others because of the association's expression or advocacy of a
particular subject or view will be upheld only if the government
demonstrates . . . a necessary abridgment of associational
freedoms." 10 7 In support of the government's interest in preventing
terrorism, Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated long before this
suit that "the primary purpose of the [AEDPA] ... is to put a stop to
fund raising by and on behalf of organizations that engage in or
102 See Peter Erlinder, Cure is Worse than Disease: Antiterrorist Law
Threatens American Freedom, STAR TRIB., Oct. 20, 1997, at 13A.
103 See id.
104 See Blown Away?, supra note 20, at 2084.
105 See id.
106 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
1 7 See id. at 1187.
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sponsor terrorist acts." 10 8 The fundraising ban is supposed to act "as
a cure for the 'disease' of terrorism outside the United States."'1 9 She
failed, however, to mention that "[tihe real losers in this equation are
the American people," 110 because the Act does very little to deter
international violence, and the actual effect of the law is to deprive
Americans of their constitutionally protected freedoms of thought and
association via a "McCarthyesque system of guilt by political
association."' 11
When considering our government's "compelling" interest in
public safety through the prevention of terrorism, one cannot deny
that violent crime is horrible; but since the frequency of terrorist
attacks is extremely low in this country, 112 that interest does not rise
to the level of "compelling." For example, the chances of an average
American person being killed by a terrorist incident is roughly equal
to the probability that a high school football player, chosen at
random, will be the "starting quarterback in the Superbowl."
'"13
Moreover, the likelihood of dying from a terrorist attack is far less
than drowning in a bathtub or falling off of a ladder. 114 Since there is
only a miniscule chance of being a victim of a terrorist attack, it
logically follows that we "should reject terrorism legislation that will
probably not save any lives and that demands that . . .[we] give up
things that [are much] more important than bathtubs.""' 5 After all,
"[w]e would not adopt the 'if it saves one life' theory to justify a ban
on bathtubs, even though hundreds of lives would be saved each
year."116
Aside from the fact that the government's interest in
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preventing terrorism is not compelling, a complete ban on financial
contributions is certainly not necessary or narrowly tailored. For
example, in many situations, "a complete ban . . does not
realistically leave any other avenues [of expression or conduct] open
[because] the only way for some individuals to support a foreign
organization may be through the donation of money."'"17  In
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, Judge Collins did not directly
consider this issue, and instead circumlocutorily stated that the
"AEDPA's exemption for medicine and religious materials does not
render the statute's limitations on the plaintiffs' right to freedom of
association greater than is essential."'" 8  Since the AEDPA's
"massive attack on the rights of Americans and legal noncitizens can
hardly be justified as necessary to prevent death and violence [in this
country, it most certainly follows that it cannot be] . . . justified as
necessary to prevent [the same from happening] in other parts of the
world."" 19 For example, violence in places such as "Northern Ireland,
the Middle East, Europe and South America arises from conflicts that
have their own dynamics and have often evolved over centuries."' 2 °
While it is true that banning weapons shipments to paramilitary units
does make sense, the banning of private contributions to orphanages
or hospitals is not only barbaric, it won't stop the fighting.' 2 "Even
if the cutting [of] such funds could have some impact upon these long
standing conflicts, the impact would be, at best, uncertain and
marginal.' 22  One thing is certain, however, "the impact of the
terrorism law on the political freedoms of people in the United States
[is] direct and devastating [in that t]his cure is far more dangerous to
Americans than the [terrorist] disease it is supposed to cure."'
123
Directing our attention to the plaintiffs' right of association
claim, the California District Court initially correctly addressed that
117See Beall, supra note 11, at 704.
118 See Humanitarian Law Project 11, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.







issue by explaining "guilt by association alone is an impermissible
basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights; rather, the
government must establish the individual's knowing affiliation with
an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific
intent to further those illegal aims." 124  Even though the court
acknowledged that the AEDPA authorizes criminal sanctions without
requiring a finding of "specific intent," it did not strike the ban down.
Instead, Judge Collins side-stepped the whole issue of specific intent
and adopted the defendants' position that "[t]he AEDPA does not
prohibit the plaintiffs from advocating on behalf of the PKK and
LTTE," or from associating with others in furtherance of their
advocacy goals. 125 The district court justified its conclusion that the
fundraising ban does not prohibit advocacy or association by
explaining that "the AEDPA does not impose guilt by
'association alone"' in violation of the First Amendment because it
only "limits the permissible ways in which the plaintiffs can associate
with the PKK and LTTE, rather than punishing ... [their] ability to
exercise their First Amendment right to associate with the PKK' and
LTTE altogether."'
126
Judge Collins' avoidance of the "specific intent" issue is
especially troubling because the very reason the Supreme Court
requires the element of scienter is to curb the legislature from
imposing strict criminal liability on possible offenders and thereby,
inhibiting constitutionally protected expression. 127  The court's
acceptance of the defendants' argument is not only troublesome but it
is certainly unwarranted because even if political association includes
ties with groups that advocate illegal conduct or engage in illegal
acts, the power of the government to penalize association is only
124 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1189-90 (citing
Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)).
125 See id. at 1192.
126 See id.
127 See Meyerov, supra note 2, at 892 (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383
U.S. 502, 511 (1966) (upholding a conviction because the defendant knew the obscene
character of the materials he possessed)).
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constitutional if it is narrowly circumscribed.128 Since the AEDPA
contains a total fundraising ban, its overbreadth definitely makes it
unconstitutional in that it implicates "all support" for groups labeled
"terrorist" rather than just implicating support for the illegal, violent
activities of those groups.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 129 the Supreme Court
stated that a law could not punish association alone, but it could
prohibit association with an organization whose members specifically
intend to further the violent goals of the group. 3 ° The AEDPA's
fundraising ban clearly violates that principle set forth in Claiborne
because guilt would accompany funding for illegal conduct as well as
humanitarian aid; such as the funding for medical supplies or funding
for educational materials (including buildings, books, etc.). Since the
government's interest in national security and foreign policy is not
compelling and a "total" ban on contributions is not narrowly
tailored, the AEDPA's fundraising ban certainly would not survive
the strict scrutiny test of Buckley or even the intermediate test of
O'Brien.13 1  Because there is no guarantee every organization
designated as "terrorist" will use contributed funds for illegal
activities rather than the legal and non-violent aspects of a group,
32
to punish private contributions for non-violent activity from U.S.
citizens is egregious and clearly unconstitutional.
In further support of the notion that the AEDPA's fundraising
ban is unnecessary to assuage the terrorist threat, it is interesting to
note that everything that terrorists do is already illegal.
33
Additionally, before the advent of the AEDPA, peaceful,
humanitarian support was "protected activity" under the Violent
128 See Humanitarian Law Project 1, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (citing
American-Arab Anti-discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1066 (9th Cir.
1995)).
129 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
130 See Beall, supra note 11, at 897 (citing Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 920).
131 See id. at 701.
132 See id.
133 See Kopel, supra note i.
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Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,134 in order to
preserve First Amendment freedoms 135 while combating the threat of
terrorism. Not only was peaceful, humanitarian support a previously
"protected activity," state and federal statutes provide extensive
authorization for investigations of possible terrorists that include even
those "who have done nothing more than talk big."' 36 Although the
AEDPA received most of its promotion from the public's response to
the Oklahoma City bombing, not a single item in the new legislation
(especially the fundraising ban) "would have prevented that heinous
crime or assisted in its resolution."' 3 7 History, itself, has proven that
the safety of the American people is best protected by the relentless
preservation of this country's constitutional freedoms, not by
increasing the already adequate powers of federal agencies. 138  In
light of that fact, Congress made a grave mistake by using the small
"but sensational threat of terrorism ...as a pretext for stripping
fundamental freedoms [of speech and association] from this country's
individual citizens"'139 via the enactment of the AEDPA.
Along with the fundraising ban, the AEDPA's terrorist
designation procedure, namely, "[t]he standards for group
designation, coupled with the fear of social censure or criminal
prosecution, [will] deter ...constitutionally protected activity.'
140
When the fundraising ban is considered in the context of already
controversial groups, the very ,fear of being designated as a terrorist
organization, as well as the actual designation itself, will adversely
affect some organizations' ability to recruit and retain members.
14 1
Presently, the terrorist designation "list includes organizations .from
134 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(c)(2).
135See Beall, supra note 11, 699-700.
136 See Kopel, supra note 1.
137 See id.
138 See id. (stating that "[qederal law enforcement agencies have more
power than they can handle, Flannery, a criminal defense lawyer in Leesburg, VA said,
'the abuses inflicted on ordinary Americans at Waco and Ruby Ridge made that all too
clear').
139See Kopel, supra note 1.
140 See Blown Away?, supra note 22, at 2083.
141 See id. at 2085.
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the Middle East, South America and other current trouble spots, but
tomorrow the list could include the IRA or the Zapatistas, depending
upon the current needs of U.S. foreign policy.'
142
The designation process is especially problematic because the
Secretary of State has virtually unreviewable power. The Secretary
of State "is free to put any foreign group on the list that [she] ...
considers violent, and [furthermore], there is no real appeal process to
get a group off the list."' 43 In light of this fact, "[i]t doesn't take an
expert in constitution [sic] law or foreign policy to understand that,
under this law, the constitutionally protected freedom of Americans
to supply international humanitarian assistance in areas of conflict
will be extinguished by [periodic] changes in U.S. foreign policy
,,144 Adtinlyth
and/or political administrations. Additionally, the potential
members of those groups that hold politically unpopular views might
see the Act as the forerunner of up and coming legislation that would
contain even more drastic consequences on membership with
domestic groups despite the fact that the AEDPA currently only
restricts donations to foreign groups. 45 Although the AEDPA's
membership deterring quality might be highly desirable in the context
of truly violent organizations, the abuse of the designation provision
could lead to the inclusion of groups that do not incite violence or
criminal acts, but simply advocate controversial views. 146 Further,
people might regret their past affiliations with such designated
groups, even if no additional action is taken.'
47
As this section illustrates, the AEDPA's fundraising ban is an
unconstitutional burden on an individual's right of association and a
severe impingement on individual free speech.' 48  Specifically,
"individuals are forced to choose between going to jail or not





147See Erlinder, supra note 102, at 13A.
148 See Beall, supra note 11, at 703.
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contributing to a designated foreign organization, even though they
may only want to support the legal aims of the group."' 4 9 It is a
choice to refrain from conduct that most certainly has a strong
expressive component. Also, "[t]here is ... a [huge] risk of a chilling
effect on membership in controversial, nondesignated groups"',50 and
that impact on the freedom of association is further magnified when
the Secretary of State's terrorist designation provision is
considered.151  Since the Secretary of State is given such broad
discretion to designate terrorist organizations, there is always a
lingering and realistic danger that she may designate groups as
terrorist that may only be politically unpopular, despite the
"requirement that the organization engage in terrorist activities."' 152
In short, abuse of discretion is a constant possibility because an
unlawful act performed by one member of a group could lead to the
whole organization being officially classified as "terrorist."'
153
VI. A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: THE ILLINOIS ANTITERRORISM
STATUTE
Given the controversial nature of the AEDPA's fundraising
ban, it is only a matter of time until the Supreme Court will be
presented with a challenge to its constitutionality. In light of the
perceived seriousness of the threat posed by terrorism as portrayed in
the news media and the resulting heightened public concern
following the Oklahoma City bombing, there is a high probability
that the Court will uphold the statute on the grounds of national
security while sacrificing individual rights.' 54 Fortunately, the
149See id. at 703-04.
150 See id. at 704.
See id. at 704 & n. 100.
152 See Beall, supra note 11, at 704.
153 See id. at 705 (quoting Melissa A. O'Laughlin, Note, Terrorism: The
Problem and the Solution - The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 22 J.
LEGIS. 103, 106 (1996)).
154See Blown Away?, supra note 22, at 2090-91.
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Supreme Court does have another state statute against which to weigh
the AEDPA - one that does not have the Act's First Amendment
problems. That antiterrorism statute is the one enacted by the Illinois
legislature; 155 a statute that appears to have been overlooked by the
California District Court at the time it examined the AEDPA's
fundraising ban in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno.1
56
In the same spirit as the AEDPA, Illinois pioneered state
action in fighting terrorist fundraising. In July 1996, Illinois passed a
law 157 that created a Class One Felony for the solicitation or
contribution of "material support" accompanied by an "intent to fund
an act of international terrorism."'58 Unlike the AEDPA, the Illinois
statute requires specific intent to fund an act of international
terrorism, as such, it reduces the possibility of infringing on protected
First Amendment freedoms. 159  Specifically, the Illinois law only
penalizes support for"illegal, violent activities ... on foreign soil.
160
By implication, the Illinois statute's "definition of
international terrorism protects support for the lawful actions of
sovereign nations by explaining that international terrorism applies
only to 'private person[s] or non-governmental entit[ies]' perpetrating
activities that are 'dangerous to human life'.' 161 As a direct result of
these specific provisions, "the law does not implicate Illinois
residents' freedom to associate with independent nations who are
conducting legitimate activities with individuals who act lawfully."'
162
In addition, "according to the law's explicit language, both the
solicitor and the contributor must intend for the donation to further an
act of violent international terrorism.' 63
155See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C (West 1999).
156 See supra notes 64-153 and accompanying text.
157 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C.
158 See Meyerov, supra note 2, at 872 (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C-5,
10, 15).
159 See id.
160 See id. at 897.
161 See id. at 897 (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C-5).
162 See Meyerov, supra note 2, at 897.
163 See id.
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Unlike the Illinois antiterrorism statute, the AEDPA's total
fundraising ban has vast negative effects that extend throughout the
fabric of our society.164 While it may appear true, in theory, that "the
ban on contributions to terrorist groups 'leav[es people] free to
engage in independent political expression [and] to associate actively
through volunteering their services,' [in reality], the AEDPA [gives
the federal government the power to] reduce membership in
controversial groups [altogether].' 65  The simple fact that "the
government [may] punish donations to a wide range of groups that
have committed no violent acts, [creates] severe[] restrict[ions on
individual] citizens' ability to make donations to [domestic] groups of
their choice;"' 66 and fear of prosecution "will prevent many ... from
exercising their right to send humanitarian aid abroad.' 67
The Illinois statute's restrictive fundraising provisions also
protect domestic organizations that engage in peaceful humanitarian
activities from criminal sanctions. 68 The AEDPA, unlike the Illinois
antiterrorism statute attacks those domestic organizations that
"legally support the objectives of foreign organizations . . . [since]
[a]ny organization in the United States that is considered an 'agent'
of a group named by the Secretary of State can also have its bank
accounts seized without any right of appeal."'169 "Had [the AEDPA]
existed in the past, the ability of Americans to legally dissent from
U.S. government foreign policy in places like Vietnam, Nicaragua
and El Salvador could have been shut off like a faucet."'' 70  When
164 See supra notes 64-153 and accompanying text.
165 See Blown Away?, supra note 22, at 2083 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 28).
166 See id. at 2083-84.
167 See Erlinder supra note 102, at 13A.
168 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C-10(a). The statute provides that
"charitable organizations, professional fund raiser[s], or professional solicitors" must
have specific intent to support international terrorism. Id. Thereby assuring that
contributions donated for peaceful purposes are exempt from criminal sanctions.
169 See Erlinder supra note 102, at 13A.
170 See id See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958)
(stating that "compelled disclosure of petitioners' Alabama membership is likely to
affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort
to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce
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taken a small step further, the AEDPA's "guilt-by-association
[characteristics] might also lead to a more destructive impulse to ban
membership in controversial groups altogether - a course of action
that current constitutional doctrine forecloses."'
7'1
As stated above, the Illinois statute is consistent with the
Supreme Court's, First Amendment jurisprudence and as such, "does
not overstep the bounds of the freedom of [speech and]
association."' 172 The legislation eliminates the problem of potential
infringement upon an individual's First Amendment rights by
requiring that both the contributor and the solicitor intend to fund an
act of international terrorism before a violation of the law may
attach.173 Since the statute contains restrictive "legal terms of art ....
it permits only the most narrow application, [and punishes only the]
support of brutal terrorist attacks on innocent civilians overseas."
't 74
In other words, the law "criminalizes only the support of violent acts
that unquestionably would be felonious according to the existing laws
of Illinois.,,'175  Therefore, the Illinois antiterrorism law is in
accordance with the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
because it contains all of the elements that the AEDPA should have
contained, more specifically, it possesses all of the safeguards
necessary to survive constitutional challenge.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our country's history has shown that government policy is
imperfect, as exemplified by McCarthy's witch hunt for communists
members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because
of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the
consequences of this exposure").
171 See Blown Away?, supra note 22, at 2087.
172 See Meyerov, supra note 2, at 896.
173 See id. at 897 (discussing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C).
174 See id. at 905.
175 See id.
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in the 1950's.176 What was most dangerous about those unsettled
times is that our government used "officials to sacrifice individual
rights in the name of national security."' 7 7 To guard against similar
travesties of justice in the future, the Constitution "must be heeded in
times of national uproar as well as national calm."'
178
In these modem times, it is likely that terrorism will become
an increasingly serious problem in the United States. Despite the
temptation to use strong preventative and punitive measures to
combat random violence against innocent persons, Congress and the
nation must not lose sight of fundamental constitutional liberties.
The anti-fundraising provisions of the AEDPA lose sight of those
liberties since the Act's provisions exceed the limits of freedom of
speech and association by creating "guilt by association" through the
punishment of mere contributions to an organization designated as
terrorist. 179 What makes the fundraising ban so dangerous is that
"[tihere is absolutely no requirement that the government prove a
contributing individual had the specific intent to advance the illegal
aims of that group."'' 80 Especially, in light of the fact that the federal
government presently has adequate means to prevent terrorist activity
without attacking the Constitution.1
8 1
While it is true that the AEDPA "makes it harder for violent
groups to raise money in America"'182 it also makes it easier for
federal agents to imprison U.S. citizens who contribute humanitarian
assistance to controversial non-terrorist groups. The AEDPA as it
now stands, allows for "[g]ovemmental infringement upon the
people's constitutionally guaranteed freedoms[, that will] have a
debilitating consequence on the democratic order in this country. ,.183
176 See Blumner, supra note 8, at I D.
177 See Blown Away?, supra note 22, at 2080 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at
635).
178 See id.
179See generally Beall, supra note II, at 703-05.
180 See id. at 699.
181 See supra, notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
182 See Nation/World Editorials, Anti-Terrorism Law Goes Too Far, THE
TAMPA TRIBUNE, Nov. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL13842326.
183 See Meyerov, supra note 2, at 905.
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Although "[tihere is some hope that the federal courts will strike
down... [the fundraising ban], [t]he question is whether it will take
as long to get over this antiterrorist hysteria as it did to get over the
anti-Communist variety, and what the cost will be to our political
freedoms until we do."'184 One thing that is certain is that the AEDPA
will "be the subject of numerous constitutional challenges that will
occur over many years."' 
85
Joseph Furst, III
184 See Erlinder, supra note 102, at 13A.
185 Se id
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